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DETENTE AND SOUTH ASIA

0

by
ARCHER K. BLOOD

ver the years, the record of the
United States in South Asia has
been a mixed one at best. Our
experience brought home to us the
limitations on our ability, particularly
regarding military assistance, to influence the
actions of the major regional states, India and
Pakistan. The Indo-Pakistani wars of 1965
and 1971 pushed us toward a posture of
gradual disengagement.
Is this posture still valid today? Do the
actions of the other two major external
powers interested in South Asia, the Soviet
Union and the People's Republic of China,
s u pport o r t hreaten a p o licy of
disengagement? Will the current detente
relationships between the United States and
the Soviet Union and between the United
States and China contribute to a moderation
of great power rivalries in the Asian
subcontinent? Or will regional crises pull the
external powers back again into the vortex of
South Asia?
Archer K. Blood, USAWC 1963, is the Deputy
Commandant for International Affairs of the US
Army War College. He received his B.A. in Economics
from the University of Virginia, and an M.A. in
International Affairs -from George Washington
University. After serving as a· Navy officer during
WWII, Mr. Blood entered the US Foreign Service in
July 1947 and was first assigned to Salonika, Greece.
He was subsequently posted 'to Munich, Athens,
Algiers, and Bonn. In 1956 Mr. Blood returned to the
State Department whe re he
served i n the Executive
Secretariat and as Cyprus Desk
Officer. He later served twice
in Dacca, East Pakistan (now
B a n g l a d e sh); Ka b ul,
Afghanistan; and in Athens.
Before coming to the USAWC
in March 1974, Mr. Blood was
Acting Direc tor of Personnel
and Deputy Director General
of the Foreign Service.

A current assessment of the strategic
importance of South Asia reveals a continued
absence of US vital interests, but a delicate
balance between the regional powers and the
three external powers. Both our checkered
experience in South Asia and our changed
perception of the strategic importance of the
area argue for a continued policy of
disengagement which, by its very lack of
commitment, favors greater flexibility and
could encourage continued restraint on the
part of the Soviet Union and China.
DISENGAGEMENT AND REASSESSMENT

Viewed through IO years of hindsight,
1965 looms as the continental divide of US
involvement in South Asia. As a prophetic
signpost, 1965 seems even more significant
than 1971 with its more dramatic but also
more aberrant even ts.
From 1950 to 1965 US involvement in the
subcontinent was sustained at a relatively high
level of resources and diplomatic energy,
relatively high, that is, for an area of the
world always considered less important than
Western Europe, the Far East, or Latin
America. The United States offered extensive
development assistance to India and Pakistan
and, to a lesser but still considerable degree,
to Afghanistan. The incorporation of Pakistan
in 1954 into the Dullesian fortress line was
a i m e d a t c o n t a i n in g Sino-Soviet
expansionism, and it gave rise to extensive
military assistance to Pakistan and to the
establishment of a communications base
outside Peshawar. This linkage with Pakistan
was marked by the signing of a Mutual
Defense Assis tan ce Agr eement, and
subsequently a bilateral Agreement of
Cooperation, as well as by Pakistan's
adherence to SEATO and the Baghdad Pact,
later CENTO.
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US dipl omatic initiatives sought a
resolution of the perennial quarrel between
Afghan istan a n d Pakist an over the
Afghan-raised Pushtunistan issue. Brief but
intensive military assistance to India followed
the Chinese-Indian border conflict of 1962.
There were occasional attempts to play a
mediatory role in the Kashmir dispute, and
our energetic, successful efforts supported the
Indus Water settlement under World Bank
auspices.
The close US ties with Pakistan did serve to
thwart the attempts of the Soviet Union to
expand its influence with the Pakistan
Government, but our military supply policy
failed signally in its purpose of achieving a
military balance on the subcontinent which
would militate against the renewal of
Pak-I n d ian h ostiliti es. Instead, we,
particularly the Congress, were appalled to see
US weapons, furnished to Pakistan for
defense against the Soviet Union and China,
used offensively against India in 1965 in an
attempt to force a decision on Kashmir. We
were also dismayed to see US arms furnished
to India for protection against the Chinese
being used to broaden the conflict with
Pakistan beyond the borders of Kashmir. The
Pak-Indian conflict of 1965 , brief though it
was, forced home on us the realization that
our ability to influence the actions of those
major regional states was ineffective when set
against the political dynamism of the
sub c ontinent and t h e two nations'
perceptions of their own national interests.
Besides, by 1965, two other important
external powers, the Soviet Union and the
People's Republic of China, were interested
and significant participants in the South Asian
game.
Our reaction was to forbid the supply of
military equipment to both India and
Pakistan. This austere policy was moderated
in 1966 to permit both countries to buy
"non-lethal end items," in 1967 to permit the
sale of spare parts for military equipment
already provided, and in l 970 on a one-time
exception to allow Pakistan to buy some
armored personnel carriers. The value of all
types of military assistance to the nations of
South Asia, however, declined from a yearly

average in the period 1950-65 of $99 million
to a yearly average in the period 1966-7 5 of
less than $16 million. A more important
comparison is the share of worldwide military
assistance commanded by the South Asian
countries in FY 1965, which was over 5 .5
percent, and their projected share for FY
I 97 5 which is only .06 percent. 1
To those of us who were serving in the
subcontinent at that time, 1965 did not
appear a particularly high signpost. We were
acutely aware of the strong congressional
disillusionment with military assistance to the
subcontinent in the wake of the 1965 war,
and we were more pessimistic than was
necessary about the opportunities for Soviet
diplomacy flowing from the Soviet Union's
peacemaking role at the Tashkent Conference.
I doubt, however, that many of us realized
the extent to which US preoccupation with
Vietnam would move South Asia, and indeed
other areas, to the back burner of priority in
the ensuing years. Nor was it apparent then
that the failure of Ayub's 1965 Kashmir
putsch had fatally destroyed his infallibility
and originated the set of circumstances which
would strengthen another revisionist force,
that of the Bengalis, and result in the division
of Pakistan in to two states.

N

ot only did US military assistance to
the subcontinent dwindle to a trickle
after 1965, but also US diplomatic activity in
the area was muted. In January 1970 the US
base near Peshawar was closed, thus removing
what was both a tangible, but declining, US
interest in the area and a Pakistani lever over
U S freedom of a ction vis-a-vis the
subcontinent.
Although the levels of US development
assistance did not decrease markedly after
1965, some of our regional elan and optimism
about development prospects in South Asia
began to disappear. We began to look less and
less on the third world as a profitable arena of
competition between the Communist and
Free World economic systems. Progress was
too slow. Rapidly increasing populations ate
up the marginal increases in food production.
Increased reliance on the institutions of state
socialism by India and, to a lesser extent, by

38

Pakistan provided a Jess productive funnel for
our aid. Also, we were comforted to see our
r iv als, t h e Soviet Union and China,
e xperiencing the same headaches and
frustrations as did we in the arena of
development assistance.
Old enthusiasms matured as we came to
realize that both Indian and Pakistani leaders
could be difficult, as well as obstinately
determined to follow their course as they saw
it. The US-Indian relationship, which had
been one of alternating fulfillment and
disillusion on both sides, gravitated toward a
plane of steady, albeit tolerable, mutual
frustration. The US-Pakistani relationship,
while always an easier one, became more
realistic and hard-headed on both sides as the
Pakistanis accepted military assistance from
the Soviets and the Chinese and lowered their
profile in SEATO and CENTO.
More important, we downgraded our
estimate of the threat of Sino-Soviet
aggression in the subcontinent. After its
successful incursion into the frontier regions
of India in 1962, China again became a paper
tiger. The Soviet Union, as we shall note,
muffed its post-Tashkent opportunities and,
besides, was following a policy not essentially
very different from our own.

establishment of the US tie with Pakistan, did
Kh rush chev and Bu lganin visit the
s u b c o n t i n e n t and initiate Soviet
developmental assistance to India. Soviet
military assistance to India was another five
years away.
Since the mid-l 950s, the underlying thrust
of Soviet policy seems to have been the
creation of a stable subcontinent through
improved relations between India and
Pakistan, while at the same time limiting US
and Chinese influence in the area. In
particular, the Soviet Union has sought to
ensure that China's flanks are contained by
states either well-disposed toward the Soviet
Union or, at a minimum, neutral with respect
to China and the Soviet Union. To the extent
that the Soviet Union and the United States
have both favored stability through
ludo-Pakistani cooperation, Soviet policy was
complementary to US objectives.
During the 1962 Chinese incursion into
India the Soviet Union, having no desire to
see India further humiliated and being
concerned about the gains achieved by the
United States and the British, worked to bring
about a halt to the fighting. In 1965 the
Soviet Union, like the United States, was
disturbed by the outbreak of war between
India and Pakistan. Like the United States,
the Soviet Union followed a policy of
neutrality although, unlike the United States,
it did not discontinue military aid.
In the Security C ouncil, Moscow
cooperated with the United States to bring
about a ceasefire resolution acceptable to
both sides and supported the Secretary
General's peace mission to the subcontinent.
In company with the United States, the
Soviet Union warned the Chinese against
taking any steps to escalate the conflict and,
like the United States, was concerned that the
conflict gave China the opportunity to
expand its influence in Pakistan.
Soviet neutrality in the 1965 war enabled
India and Pakistan to accept a Soviet
mediatory role at the Tashkent Conference
the following year. Although Soviet prestige
and influence in South Asia seemed at a new
high, the aftermath of Tashkent was not a
success story for Soviet diplomacy. After

It is tempting but unrealistic
to look upon Russian/Soviet
policy toward South Asia as
one o f consistent, patient
p r e s su re for control and
influence, dating back to the early 19th
century and culminating successfully in Soviet
sponsorship of the winning side in the 1971
war between India and Pakistan. In the 19th
century, Russian aspirations sou th of the
Hindu Kush figured more prominently in the
imagination of British writers like Kipling and
British administrators like Lord Auckland
than in the councils of Czarist ministers.
Molotov's so-called expression of historic
interest in South Asia and the Indian Ocean in
1940 now seems to be more of a German
move to deflect Soviet interests from the
Balkans and the Middle East than a true
reading of Soviet goals.
Not until 1955, in the wake of the
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some initial progress in the withdrawal of
troops, the exchange of prisoners, and the
restoration of air, postal, and telegraphic
links, Indo-Pakistani antagonisms reasserted
themselves. The leaders of the two countries
did not hold any follow-on meetings and
trade connections remained severed. In
Pakistan the Tashkent agreement was
attacked as a pledge not to use force to settle
the Kashmir dispute.
Soviet mediation at Tashkent and the
subsequent Soviet attempt to play the role of
the honest broker in the subcontinent did not
succeed in achieving a reconciliation between
India and Pakistan. Nor did the more involved
Soviet role serve to weaken Pakistan's ties
with Peking or Washington, despite the
provision of Soviet military equipment to
Pakistan beginning in 1968. When, in June
1969, Brezhnev launched his proposal for
regional economic cooperation followed by a
collective ses:,urity arrangement, India was
cool and President Y ahya effectively scuttled
the scheme for regional economic cooperation
b y decl ining to participate in a
Soviet-sponsored conference in Kabul.
The Soviet Union, like the United States,
thus experienced the futility and frustration
of trying to hustle the East into a stability
which neither major regional power was
willing to purchase at the expense of its vital
interests. Again, like the United States, the
Soviets discovered that the other two external
powers could exert an effective brake against
the growth of the third power's influence
through their ties and influence with one or
other of the regional powers.

between the Soviet Union and Afghanistan
since the latter part of the 19th century.
China, on the other hand, looked at India
over the buffer states of Nepal, Bhutan,
Sikkim, and Tibet until the last two lost their
buffer status through the incorporation of the
one into India and the other into China. In
addition, Chinese territory, including Tibet, is
contiguous to both the Pakistani and Indian
areas of Kashmir, the Indian states of Uttar
Pradesh and Himachal Pradesh, and the North
East Frontier Agency.
Secondly, because it had a direct clash of
interest with a regional state, a state whose
power differential was not considered to be
s ignificant, China could not play the
detached, mediatory role which the United
States and the Soviet Union occasionally
assumed.
Yet once the border dispute with India was
solved militarily to Chinese satisfaction,
China's invo lvemen t i n South Asia
diminished. China continued its support of
Pakistan through military and economic
assistance and diplomatic means, probably
aimed more toward countering US and Soviet
influence with Pakistan than it was directed
against India. China also harassed India
through support to the Naxalites in West
Bengal and the Mizo and Naga insurgents in
Eastern India.
During the, 1965 war, China supported
l'akistan by making some threatening moves
along the Sino-Indian border but desisted
from any strong action in the face of US and
Soviet warnings. Of the three external powers,
only China was not neutral in 1965.
Consequently, she was able to strengthen her
position with Pakistan by taking over first
place as arms purveyor to that country.
Immersed in the problems of the cultural
revolution, the Chinese seemed to take a less
active interest in the subcontinent after 1966,
while maintaining their intimate connection
with Pal:istan.
China's relatively restrained policy toward
South Asia suggests a restrained Chinese
interest in the region, focused primarily on
the maintenance of stability and the security
of the Chinese marchlands along the
Himalayas. Anparently China has not thus far

*****

Chinese involvement in the
affairs of the subcontinent has
differed in kind and extent
f r o m U S a n d S ov i e t
involvement because of two
factors in the Sino-South Asian relationship
not shared with the other two external
powers. First, its geographic proximity is
more marked, giving rise to actual border
disputes with the largest of the South Asian
states. Although the Soviet Union shares a
common border with Afghanistan, there has
been no border issue or conflict of interests
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looked upon South Asia as an area of great
opportunity, and has not striven very
energetically to exploit the potential for
exerc1smg leadership over indigenous
revolutionary forces, in part because of its ties
to the nonrevolutionary state of Pakistan.

T

tensions on the subcontinent and impeded,
rather than facilitated, external power efforts
to bring the crisis under control.
At the inception of the crisis in March
1971, it is unlikely that any one of the
players wanted to see the breakup of
Pakistan: not the United States, not China,
not the Soviet Union, and not even India
which stood to gain from an aJI-Pakistan
government under the control of the Awami
League that pledged better relations with
India. All three external powers seemed
relatively content with the status quo in early
1971, and apprehensive over drastic changes
in the political map of the subcontinent.
At first, the Soviet Union foJlowed a fairly
neutral course. While censuring Pakistan's
repressive actions in East Pakistan, the Soviet
Union urged a peaceful solution of the
dispute within the framework of a united
Pakistan. Chinese public comment on the
crisis was sparse and generally noncommittal.
India, although making no secret of its
sympathy for the Bengali insurgents, refrained
from legal recognition of Bangladesh and
overt military assistance to the insurgents.
It is moot whether the US opening to
China was more of a reason or a pretext for
th e Treaty of Peace, Friendship and
Cooperation between the Soviet Union and
India that was signed in New Delhi on 9
August 197 I. To India, the new US-Chinese
relationship meant that the United States
would probably not join hands with the
Soviet Union, as it did in 1965, to warn China
against any show of force in support of
Pakistan if the East Pakistan crisis deepened
into war. Consequently, India could look only
to the Soviet Union for support. The Soviet
Union, for its part, might have conceived of
the pact to some extent as a counter to a
s u d d e n l y i mpro v ed Sino-America n
relationship. But certain scholars have argued
that Moscow hoped primarily that the pact
would stabilize the situation by discouraging
any precipitate action by Pakistan, which now
knew that India would have Soviet support,2
or by providing some leverage in restraining
India if that became necessary. 3 To Pakistan,
after the fact, it appeared that the Indo-Soviet
pact had been intended as a deliberate Indian

I

he lessened US involvement in South
Asia, which dates from 1965, preceded
the Nixon or Guam Doctrine of 1969 and the
beginning of the current detente relationship
with the Soviet Union. Our disengagement
from South Asia is sometimes referred to as a
case study in the Nixon Doctrine, but it really
occurred before application of that doctrine.
The US-Soviet detente, while hospitable to
restrained US-Soviet rivalry in South Asia,
was not an important contributor to the
standoff in the relationship o f all three
external powers to the subcontinent. Rather,
each of the powers had learned of its limited
ability to exert significant influence over a
sustained period, either because of checks
imposed by the other external powers or,
more pointedly, because of rubbing up against
the assertive nationalism of the regional
states. "Once burned, twice shy" is perhaps
too strong an adage to be applicable here.
Still, of the three external powers, the United
States and the Soviet Union carry some scar
tissue, and all three have seen enough of
subcontinental fires to be leery about
plunging too deeply into South Asian affairs.
ENGAGEMENT AND REASSESSMENT

The dramatic US opening to China
occurred during the incubation of the 1971
crisis which was to explode before the end of
that year in hostilities between India and
Pakistan and to give birth to Bangladesh. The
coincidence of the cns1s and the
establishment of a different Sino-American
relationship intensified the impact of the new
three-cornered detente on the two principal
South Asian states and the third external
power. To complicate matters further, the
focus of the crisis, Pakistan, had played a
helpful role in bringing about the new
relationship. Consequently, the US opening to
China exacerbated, rather than checked,
41

any manner alarming to the United States; the
United States has acknowledged the enhanced
power of India; and China has continued its
restrained role. Over all these developments
the new and broadened detente relationship
has cast a beneficial shadow, as the three
external powers presumably attach more
importance to the new relationship than to
stirring up new rivalries in South Asia. Thus,
the 1971 crisis, while it drew the three
external powers willy-nilly into immediate
involvement in South Asian affairs, may turn
out to be only a temporary and reversible
sidetracking of the longer-term trend of
disengagement dating from the mid-l960s.

move to prepare for its invasion of East
Pakistan.
When hostilities broke out, the two-sided
triangle of the evolving US-Soviet and
US-Chinese relationship did not prove to be as
effective a platform for crisis management as
had the pre-detente US-Soviet cooperation in
1965, when neither had any reason to be
beholden to Chinese sensitivities. The balance
of power in the subcontinent, suddenly made
more intricate by the US opening to China
and the Soviet pact with India at a time of
regional crisis, made it easier for the regional
states to play off one external power against
another, and made a genuinely neutral role
more difficult for the United States and the
Soviet Union.
Nor did the leverage of the major powers
over the actions of the regional states turn out
to be decisive. US efforts with President
Yahya to bring about a change in the suicidal
policies of the Pakistani military ran out of
time. The Chinese were unable to deter India
from moving on Pakistan, and the Soviets
watched from the sidelines as the crisis drifted
into war.
In the immediate aftermath of the
December 1971 war, most observers of the
South Asian scene were prone to belabor the
enhanced Soviet influence resulting from
support of the victorious Indians and the
correspondingly lessened influence of the
United States and China. Now, over three
years later, the starkness of these earlier
impressions has been moderated by the
processes of adjustment and accommodation
under way on the subcontinent.

R ESTRAINT AND REASSESSMENT

A well-conceived foreign policy toward a
region should always adjust to the realities of
the situation in that area. The problem in
giving substance to this truism lies in
determining what forces drive a government's
perception of these realities or, as they are
more often termed, national interests. In the
case of South Asia, does the gradually evolved
US posture of taking a reduced part in the
affairs of the subcontinent represent:
• greater wisdom accumulated through
a l m o st thi rty years of exp erience,
comprehending a conscious judgment that
South Asia now represents less of a threat and
less of an opportunity;
• distraction to higher priority involvement
in neighboring areas, first Indochina and then
the Middle East; or,
• an attempt to rationalize past frustrations
and to console ourselves into believing that
our interests are not particularly large and
important because we no longer have the
resources or the will to support these
interests?
The answer appears to contain all three
elements, but the first is clearly the most
important determinant.
The bogeyman of Soviet or Chinese
military aggression in South Asia, never very
substantial, seems even less so today in the
l ight of the Sino-Soviet hostility and
improved US relations with both the Soviet
Union and China. Geographically, South Asia

P

akistan seems to have reconciled itself
amazingly fast and well to the loss of its
eastern wing, and probably is better off
politically and financially for it. Bangladesh,
in desperate need of external assistance, has
no reason to be hostile to any external power.
India, its pact with the Soviet Union
notwithstanding, has displayed a desire to
warm relations with the United States, and
even the tentative stirrings of an interest in
looking toward an eventual improvement of
its relations with China. The Soviet Union has
not sought to capitalize on its 1971 gains in
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is protected by tremendous mountain ranges,
making major aggression extremely difficult.
Moreover, the principal centers of Soviet and
Chinese power are remote from South Asia.4
Nor need we be apprehensive over the
prospects of internal subversion through
indigenous Communist parties, at least in the
near run or foreseeable future. In India, the
Communists are plagued by factionalism. In
Bangladesh, they have not yet succeeded in
making substantial inroads into the political
control of the dominant Awami League,
nurtured on the still powerful spring of
B e ngali nationalism. In Pakistan, the
Communists have remained weak and unable
to exert any effective influence over the
course of political developments.
South Asia possesses no natural resources
which are needed urgently by the United
States. Only one percent of US overseas
foreign investment is in South Asia and US
trade with the countries of the subcontinent
has not been significant, appearing to hold
little potential for substantial expansion.
Many writers have seen a derivative
strategic importance for South Asia because
of potential US-Soviet naval rivalry in the
Indian Ocean. Such importance is likely to
remain more hypothetical than actual until
such time as a regional state, such as Iran or
India, has the ability to project military
power into the Indian Ocean to a meaningful
degree, and as long as no regional state
provides base facilities to either the Soviet
Union or the United States.
Similarly, the transformation of East
Pakistan into Bangladesh does not seem to
have altered substantially that land's lack of
strategic importance. A perceptive AID
colleague in Dacca was fond of saying that
"The strategic unimportance of East Pakistan
(in great power eyes) cannot be
underestimated." Now that the Bengalis have
achieved independence, it can be argued
perhaps that India no longer has to worry
about a potentially hostile rear area in the
event of renewed hostilities with China in the
North East Frontier Agency. India's problems
with insurgents in the areas bordering
Bangladesh, however, have probably not
diminished because of the chaotic law and

order situation and the quantity of loose arms
in Bangladesh.

0

ur purely bilateral relations with the
countries of South Asia present few
significant problems. That most quotable of
our ambassadors to South Asia, former
Ambassador to India Daniel P. Moynihan,
said, "The relationship between the United
States and India is one in which there is no
significant conflict of interest. . . . Neither
covets the territory, trade or prestige of the
other, nor do we compete for the attention or
favors of third countries." 5 The same
statement could be made with respect to the
other nations in the subcontinent, or indeed,
to most of the countries in the Third World
with whom our problems, if they exist, nearly
always involve the relations of one or the
other of us with third countries.
Indeed, the danger of these third country
problems should be enough to keep us from
being lulled into believing that the current,
tolerably stable situation on the subcontinent
is necessarily deep-rooted or permanent.
There is always the danger that some one of
the regional states will seek the support of
one or more of the external powers in order
to strengthen its position in a dispute with
another state on the subcontinent, or to help
redress the regional power balance more in its
favor. Both India and Pakistan have sought
and obtained external support in the past.
Yet, balanced against a regional state's
temptation to solicit outside support and an
external power's temptation to provide that
support is the underlying suspicion of the
South Asian nations regarding great power
activities, and the corresponding desire of the
regional states to assert an independent course
of action as much as possible.
In this connection, the July 1972 Simla
Agreement between India and Pakistan is
encouraging since it signified the intention of
the two most important regional states to
reconcile their differences on a bilateral basis.
The three external powers, by welcoming the
agreement, have chosen to follow a policy of
noninvolvement in disputes between India
and Pakistan. Further, the Simla process
offers some hope even with regard to the
43

perennial problem of Kashmir. Although it is
difficult to foresee a Kashmir settlement
acceptable to both India and Pakistan,
progress toward an eventual settlement seems
greater in a bilateral context than if pursued
in a wider arena such as the United Nations.
The internal power balance in South Asia,
changed perceptibly in India's favor as the
result of the 1971 war, is still an unsteady
one. India is now perched higher than
Pakistan on the seesaw, but not so much
higher as to cause the plank to move all the
w ay in one direction. The new situation on
the subcontinent seems to call for Indian
preeminence without domination, inequality
of power without hegemony. Such a balance
will necessarily be a delicate one, easily upset
b y one of the external powers and
concei vably calling for the occasional
insertion of some remedial external pressure.
Phillips Talbot has written of the post-1971
grouping of India, Pakistan and Bangladesh as
a "menage a trois" on the subcontinent.6 For
the bulk of the post-World War II period,
South Asia has also been an uneasy menage a
trois for the United States, the Soviet Union,
and China. In the longer run, the South Asian
scene could be altered significantly if the
present triad of external powers capable of
influencing developments in the area should
expand to include Iran, which is already
beginning to play an expanded role, and
Japan. Again in the longer run, should its
power increase markedly, then India, a nation
which already has the world's fourth largest
armed force and is an incipient nuclear power,
might well chafe at even a restrained effort of
the external powers to manipulate a security
balance in South Asia. Indian writers are now
beginning to express the hope that the
possession of nuclear weapons by India could
permit Indian policymakers to treat the
subcontinent as India's security zone and to
forestall foreign interference. 7 In other
words, the present distinction between the
regional states and the major external powers,
which is largely one of power, might come to
be less meaningful.

in President Nixon's report to the Congress on
3 May 1973 entitled "US Foreign Policy for
the 1970s." In this report President Nixon
said:
The relations between the countries of
South Asia and countries outside the
region must be consistent with the peace
and independence of the subcontinent
and the peace of the world. If any outside
power acquires an exclusive position in an
area of this mass and potential, others
will be forced to respond. The major
powers all have important relationships
there. No South Asian interest is served if
those relationships are embroiled in local
tensions . ... We see no reason why we
cannot have bilateral ties with each
country in South Asia consistent with its
own aspirations and ours, and not
directed against any other nation. We
shall gear our relations with other major
powers outside the region to encourage
policies of restraint and noninterference.8

S u c h a p olicy is a
prescription for continued
mutual restraint by all three
external powers, resting to a
considerable extent on our
belief that neither the Soviet Union nor China
will want to risk its detente relationship with
the United States by taking steps in the
subcontinent that might provoke a
countervailing response from us. Detente is
thus explicitly credited with an important
role in the preservation of stability in South
Asia. Interestingly, the President spoke not of
the vital interests but of the "important
relationships" of the major powers. The term
"relationship" suggests a historically-derived
configuration of concerns with a particular
country rather than a cold, hard assessment of
that country's strategic importance to us. The
most obvious of these relationships are the
Soviet Union's relationships with India and
Ban g ladesh, China's relationship with
Pakistan, and the United States' relationships
with India and Bangladesh, as well as with
Pakistan.
Our undertaking to practice restraint and

The latest ex cathedra pronouncement on
overall US policy toward South Asia is found
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noninterference, provided the other major
powers follow suit, should favor greater
objectivity in our diplomacy toward South
Asia. Some specific corollaries of a policy of
restraint would be:
• a scrupulously restrained military supply
policy small enough as to be easily terminated
if continued military supply seemed more of a
liability than an asset;
• a meticulous effort to keep tabs on arms
sales to Iran and the Arab nations to preclude
these sales from being transformed, against
our intention, into indirect military deliveries
to Pakistan or into a war reserve for Pakistan;
• the firm eschewal of any bases in the
subcontinent; and
• a cooling of our rhetoric which in the
past has often connoted a degree of
commitment greater than a policy of
r e s t r a i n e d n o n i n vo l v em e nt w o u ld
appropriately support.
For example, is it accurate or necessary to
continue to refer to Pakistan as an ally, when
we have no enemy in common and when our
common objective boils down to the
continued independence and integrity of
Pakistan, the type of goal that we could say
we shared with most of the countries of the
world? Support and friendship can be offered
in ways more meaningful and less misleading
than through outmoded rhetoric.
IF the restraint of our words matches the
restraint of our involvement, which in turn

matches and encourages the restraint of the
Soviet Union or China, our policy toward
South Asia should afford us the flexibility to
adapt more readily to changing situations in
this volatile part of the world where crises
have a way of catching fire despite our most
conscientious efforts and despite the
beneficial damper of detente.
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